

Equiconsistencies between very large cardinals and strengthenings of PFA

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Some Thoughts on the Consistency Strength of PFA

The evidence

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Theorem (Magidor '76, Viale '06)

Relative to a supercompact cardinal it is consistent that κ is supercompact and

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But what is this really evidence for?

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These notions are as rigorous as your belief in (i) the strength of natural theories corresponds to large cardinals and (ii) the large cardinal hierarchy is wellordered.

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So practical consistency strength = standard consistency strength in these cases.

Indeed, everybody knows that this is almost always true.

But its not always always true!

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It is totally unclear (to me) where the practical consistency strength and SSP-practical consistency strength of “NS $_{\omega_1}$ is ω_1 -dense” lies.

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Why should consistency strength and practical consistency strength agree in the case of PFA?

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How low can we go?

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Can we tell impractical statements from practical statements heuristically?

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Theorem (Schindler, Steel)

The consistency strength of φ is slightly less than infinitely many strong cardinals.

A Candidate Suggested By Woodin

This candidate for an impractical statement of consistency strength below a Woodin was suggested by Woodin. It is related to the 12th Delfino problem. Consider

φ = “All projective sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, have the property of Baire and are uniformized by projective sets”.

These are all natural consequences of projective determinacy. The 12th Delfino asks whether φ is equivalent to projective determinacy. This was answered in the negative by Steel.

Theorem (Schindler, Steel)

The consistency strength of φ is slightly less than infinitely many strong cardinals.

The only known upper bound for practical consistency strength is the strength of PD.

Maximality Principles and Correct Forcing Axioms

Maximality Principles

Maxmimality Principles

For \mathcal{P} a class of forcings, a statement $\varphi(x)$ is **provably \mathcal{P} -persistent** if

$$\text{ZFC} \vdash \forall x(\varphi(x) \rightarrow \forall \mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P} V^{\mathbb{P}} \models \varphi(x)).$$

Definition (Stavi-Väänänen)

Let Γ be a class of first order formulas, \mathcal{P} a definable class of forcings. $\Gamma\text{-MP}(\mathcal{P}, A)$ holds if

$$\forall \text{provably } \mathcal{P}\text{-persistent } \varphi \in \Gamma \forall a \in A \left(\exists \mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P} V^{\mathbb{P}} \models \varphi(a) \rightarrow V \models \varphi(a) \right).$$

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Definition

$\text{FA}_{\omega_1}(\mathcal{P})$ holds if for any $\leq \omega_1$ -many dense subsets of some $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$, there is a filter $g \subseteq \mathbb{P}$ meeting all those dense sets.

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Fact (Jensen)

The following are equivalent.

1. $\text{FA}_{\omega_1}(\mathcal{P})$.
2. *Whenever $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$ and θ is sufficiently large and regular, $\mathbb{P} \in X \subseteq H_\theta$ is of size ω_1 then there is some $Y < H_\theta$ of size ω_1 , $X \cup \omega_1 \subseteq Y$ such that if*

$$\pi: M \rightarrow Y$$

is the anticollapse then there is a M -generic filter $g \subseteq \pi^{-1}(\mathbb{P})$.

Definition

Recall that $\text{FA}_{\omega_1}^+(\mathcal{P})$ holds if for all $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$, \mathcal{D} a set of $\leq \omega_1$ -many dense subsets of \mathbb{P} and \dot{S} a name for a stationary subset of ω_1 , there is a \mathcal{D} -generic filter g with \dot{S}^g stationary.

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Suppose \mathcal{P} is a definable class of forcings and Γ is a class of first order formulas. The **Correct Forcing Axiom** $\Gamma\text{-CFA}(\mathcal{P})$ holds if whenever $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$, θ is sufficiently large and regular, $\dot{a} \in H_\theta$, $\varphi \in \Gamma$ is provably \mathcal{P} -persistent and

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for some $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$ then there is some elementary $Y < H_\theta$ of size ω_1 with $\omega_1 \cup \{\dot{a}, \mathbb{P}\} \subseteq Y$ such that if

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Fact (Goodman)

$\Gamma\text{-CFA}(\mathcal{P})$ implies both $\text{FA}_{\omega_1}(\mathcal{P})$ and $\Gamma\text{-MP}(\mathcal{P}, H_{\omega_2})$ (for nontrivial Γ).

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Note that Σ_2 -CPFA \Rightarrow Π_1 -CPFA \Rightarrow $\text{PFA}^+ = \{“S \text{ is a stationary subset of } \omega_1”\}$ -CPFA.

CPFA is consistent

Goodman has shown that Σ_n -CPFA is consistent for all n , relative to large cardinals. Recall that $C^{(n)}$ consists of all κ with $V_\kappa <_{\Sigma_n} V$.

Definition

A cardinal κ is **supercompact** for $C^{(n)}$ if for every $\lambda \geq \kappa$ there is a λ -supercompactness embedding $j: V \rightarrow M$ with $\text{crit}(j) = \kappa$ and $j(C^{(n)}) \cap \lambda = C^{(n)} \cap \lambda$.

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Theorem (Goodman)

Suppose κ is supercompact for $C^{(n)}$. Then there is a proper forcing \mathbb{P} with

$$V^{\mathbb{P}} \models \Sigma_{n+1}\text{-CPFA}.$$

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- Goodman's consistency proof of Σ_{n+1} -CPFA seems optimal in the same way Baumgartner's consistency proof of PFA seems optimal.
- If you believe that the consistency strength of PFA is a supercompact cardinal then you should believe that the consistency strength of Σ_{n+1} -CPFA is a supercompact for $C^{(n)}$ -cardinal.
- Maybe it is easier to get a high lower bound for the consistency of Σ_{n+1} -CPFA for large n .

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The mantle \mathbb{M} is defined as

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- But this does not mean this idea could not work in another context!

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Suppose $n \geq 4$ and Σ_n -CPFA and BA holds. Then $\omega_2 \in (C^{(n)})^{\mathbb{M}}$.

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Suppose $\mathbb{M} \models \exists x \psi(x)$ holds and $\psi \in \Pi_{n-1}$. Then the statement

$$\varphi = \exists x \in V_{\omega_2} \cap \mathbb{M} \mathbb{M} \models \psi(x)$$

is Σ_n by Fact above + BA, is provably persistent and forced by $\text{Col}(\omega_1, \theta)$ for sufficiently large θ . Thus φ holds in V . □

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In particular, ω_2 is inaccessible in \mathbb{M} under Σ_4 -CPFA.

This can be used to separate all Σ_n -CFA(\mathcal{P}) for $n \geq 3$ and fixed reasonable \mathcal{P} .

An Equiconsistency

One can prove much more:

Theorem (L.)

Suppose $n \geq 4$, Π_n -CPFA and BA holds. Then

$$\mathbb{M} \models \text{"}\omega_2^V \text{ is supercompact for } C^{(n)}\text{"}.$$

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Corollary (Goodman, L.)

The following theories are equiconsistent for $n \geq 4$:

1. $\text{ZFC} + \exists \kappa \text{ “}\kappa \text{ is supercompact for } C^{(n)}\text{”}.$
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In particular, the practical consistency strength of Σ_{n+1} -CPFA is exactly a supercompact for $C^{(n)}$ -cardinal.

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Question

Does Π_4 -CPFA imply BA?

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Theorem (Woodin)

Suppose κ is extendible. Exactly one of the following holds.

1. Every singular $\rho \geq \kappa$ is singular in HOD and $\rho^+ = (\rho^+)^{\text{HOD}}$.
2. Every regular $\lambda \geq \kappa$ is ω -strongly measurable in HOD.

The M-Dichotomy

The \mathbb{M} -Dichotomy

For an inner model $M \subseteq V$, let $N(M)$ arise from M by feeding $\kappa \cap \text{cof}(\omega)$ and $M \cap (\text{NS}_\kappa \restriction \text{cof}(\omega))$ into M , for all κ of uncountable cofinality.

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Suppose Π_4 -CPFA holds. Then exactly one of the following holds for $N = N(\mathbb{M})$.

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It is tempting to conjecture that 1. always holds.

Wild Speculations

Let's speculate on two possible scenarios for $n \geq 4$.

Case 1: The consistency strength of Π_n -CPFA is exactly a supercompact for $C^{(n)}$ -cardinal. It seems likely that Π_4 -CPFA implies BA in this scenario. In particular, case 1. of the dichotomy is provable.

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Case 2: The consistency strength of Π_4 -CPFA is low. In this scenario, Π_4 -CPFA does not prove BA and maybe even option 2. in the dichotomy is possible. Maybe $\text{con}(\text{PFA})$ is below a supercompact as well and the optimal method to produce models of PFA can be used to produce models of Π_4 -CPFA. In particular, this method likely produces models of $\neg\text{BA}$.