Insolubles.

The most famous insoluble: **the Liar**.

This sentence is false.

In the early literature on insolubles, there are five solutions to this paradox:

- *secundum quid et simpliciter*.
- *transcasus*.
- Distinction between the exercised act and the signified act.
- *restrictio*.
- *cassatio*.

More modern solutions.

- Thomas Bradwardine (c.1295-1349).
- Roger Swyneshed (mid XIVth century).
- William Heytesbury (c.1310-1372).

Heytesbury.

William Heytesbury (c.1310-1372).

- *1335*. *Regulae solvendi sophismata.*
- *The source of the paradox according to Heytesbury:* The Liar "$\varphi : \varphi$ is false" is only paradoxical since we want to retain the usual theory of signifi cation for it. If we give that up, there is no paradox. For example, φ could signify "*Socrates currit*" which is free of paradoxes.
- But φ cannot be evaluated according to the usual theory of signifi cation. Therefore, anyone who utters φ must have some other hidden signifi cation in mind. There is no way to analyze φ further before we know which one this is.

Dialogic Logic (1).

Paul Lorenzen (1958): Explaining the meaning of propositional connectives via games and strategies.

- Two players, the **Proponent** and the **Opponent**.
- In the round 0, the Proponent has to assert the formula to be proved and the Opponent can make as many assertions as he wants. After that, the opponent starts the game.
- In all other moves, the players have to do an *announcement* and an *action*.
- An **announcement** is either of the form $\mathbf{attack}(n)$ or of the form $\mathbf{defend}(n)$, interpreted as "I shall attack the assertion made in round n" and "I shall defend myself against the attack made in round n".

Dialogic Logic (2).

- An **action** can be one of the following moves:
  - $\mathbf{assert}(\Phi)$,
  - $\mathbf{which\ one}?$,
  - $\mathbf{left}?$,
  - $\mathbf{right}?$,
  - $\mathbf{what\ if}?, \mathbf{assert}(\Phi)$.
- You can only attack lines in which the other player asserted a formula. Depending on the formula, the following attacks are allowed:
  - $\Phi \vee \Psi$ may be attacked by $\mathbf{which\ one}?$,
  - $\Phi \wedge \Psi$ may be attacked by $\mathbf{left}?$ or $\mathbf{right}?$,
  - both $\Phi \to \Psi$ and $\neg\Phi$ may be attacked by "$\mathbf{what\ if}?, \mathbf{assert}(\Phi)$".

Dialogic Logic (3).

- You can only defend against a line in which the other player attacked. Depending on the attack, the following defenses are allowed:
  - If $\Phi \vee \Psi$ was attacked by $\mathbf{which\ one}?$, you may defend with either $\mathbf{assert}(\Phi)$ or $\mathbf{assert}(\Psi)$.
  - If $\Phi \wedge \Psi$ was attacked by $\mathbf{left}?$, you may defend with $\mathbf{assert}(\Phi)$, if it was attacked by $\mathbf{right}?$, you may defend with $\mathbf{assert}(\Psi)$.
  - If $\Phi \rightarrow \Psi$ was attacked by "$\mathbf{what\ if}?, \mathbf{assert}(\Phi)$", you may defend with $\mathbf{assert}(\Psi)$.
  - You cannot defend an attack on $\neg\Phi$.

Dialogic Logic (4).

The rules of the (constructive) game:

- In each move, the action and the announcement have to fit together, i.e., if the player announces $\mathbf{attack}(n)$ or $\mathbf{defend}(n)$, then the action has to be an attack on move n or a defense against move n.
- In round $n+1$, the Opponent has to either attack or defend against round n.
- An attack is called open if it has not yet been defended.
- The Proponent may attack any round, but may only defend against the most recent open attack. He may use any defense or attack against a given round at most once.
- The Opponent may assert any atomic formulas.
- The Proponent may assert only atomic formulas that have been asserted by the Opponent before.

Dialogic logic (5).

If one player cannot make any legal moves anymore, the other player has won.

Example 1.

0		—		$\textbf{assert}(p \wedge q \to q \wedge p)$
1	$\textbf{attack}(0)$	$\textbf{what if}?\ \textbf{assert}(p \wedge q)$		
2			$\textbf{attack}(1)$	$\textbf{left}?$
3	$\textbf{defend}(2)$	$\textbf{assert}(p)$		
4			$\textbf{attack}(1)$	$\textbf{right}?$
5	$\textbf{defend}(4)$	$\textbf{assert}(q)$		
6			$\textbf{defend}(1)$	$\textbf{assert}(q \wedge p)$
7	$\textbf{attack}(6)$	$\textbf{left}?$		
8			$\textbf{defend}(7)$	$\textbf{assert}(q)$
9	—	—		

Dialogic logic (5).

If one player cannot make any legal moves anymore, the other player has won.

Example 1.

0		—		$\textbf{assert}(p \wedge q \rightarrow q \wedge p)$
1	$\textbf{attack}(0)$	$\textbf{what if}?\ \textbf{assert}(p \wedge q)$		
2			$\textbf{attack}(1)$	$\textbf{left}?$
3	$\textbf{defend}(2)$	$\textbf{assert}(p)$		
4			$\textbf{attack}(1)$	$\textbf{right}?$
5	$\textbf{defend}(4)$	$\textbf{assert}(q)$		
6			$\textbf{defend}(1)$	$\textbf{assert}(q \wedge p)$
7	$\textbf{attack}(6)$	$\textbf{right}?$		
8			$\textbf{defend}(7)$	$\textbf{assert}(p)$
9	—	—		

Dialogic logic (6).

We say that Φ is **dialogically valid** if the Proponent has a winning strategy in the game in which he asserts Φ in round 0.

In symbols: $\models_{\text{dialog}} \Phi$.

The dialogically valid formulas are exactly those provable in intuitionistic propositional logic.

Example 2.

0		—		$\mathbf{assert}(\neg\neg p \to p)$
1	$\mathbf{attack}(0)$	$\mathbf{what\ if?\ assert}(\neg\neg p)$		
2			$\mathbf{attack}(1)$	$\mathbf{what\ if?\ assert}(\neg p)$
3	$\mathbf{attack}(2)$	$\mathbf{what\ if?\ assert}(p)$		
4			—	—

Dialogic Logic (7).

The rules of the (constructive) game:

- In each move, the action and the announcement have to fi t together, i.e., if the player announces $\mathbf{attack}(n)$ or $\mathbf{defend}(n)$, then the action has to be an attack on move n or a defense against move n.
- In round $n+1$, the Opponent has to either attack or defend against round n.
- The Proponent may attack any round, but may only defend against the most recent open attack. He may use any defense or attack against a round at most once.
- The Opponent may assert any atomic formulas.
- The Proponent may assert only atomic formulas that have been asserted by the Opponent before.

Dialogic Logic (7).

The rules of the (classical) game:

- In each move, the action and the announcement have to fit together, i.e., if the player announces $\mathbf{attack}(n)$ or $\mathbf{defend}(n)$, then the action has to be an attack on move n or a defense against move n.
- In round $n+1$, the Opponent has to either attack or defend against round n.
- The Proponent may attack and defend against any round. He may use any defense or attack against a round at most once.
- The Opponent may assert any atomic formulas.
- The Proponent may assert only atomic formulas that have been asserted by the Opponent before.

Dialogic logic (8).

We say that Φ is **classically valid** if the Proponent has a winning strategy in the (classical) game in which he asserts Φ in round 0.

In symbols: $\models_{\text{class}} \Phi$.

The classically valid formulas are exactly those provable in classical propositional logic.

Example 2a.

0		—		$\textbf{assert}(\neg\neg p \to p)$
1	$\textbf{attack}(0)$	$\textbf{what if? assert}(\neg\neg p)$		
2			$\textbf{attack}(1)$	$\textbf{what if? assert}(\neg p)$
3	$\textbf{attack}(2)$	$\textbf{what if? assert}(p)$		
4			$\textbf{defend}(1)$	$\textbf{assert}(p)$
5	—	—		

***Obligationes* (1).**

Obligationes. A game-like disputation, somewhat similar to logic games. The origin is unclear, as is the purpose.
The name derives from the fact that one of the players is “obliged” to follow certain formal rules of discourse.

Different types of *obligationes*.

- *positio*.
- *depositio*.
- *dubitatio*.
- *impositio*.
- *petitio*.
- *rei veritas / sit verum*.

Obligationes (2).

- William of Shyreswood (1190-1249)
- Walter Burley (Burleigh; c.1275-1344)
- Roger Swyneshed (d.1365)
- Richard Kilvington (d.1361)
- William Ockham (c.1285-1347)
- Robert Fland (c.1350)
- Richard Lavenham (d.1399)
- Ralph Strode (d.1387)
- Peter of Candia
- Paul of Venice (c.1369-1429)

Obligationes (3).

- Walter Burley, *De obligationibus*.
  Standard set of rules.
- Roger Swyneshed, *Obligationes* (1330-1335).
  Radical change in one of the rules results in a distinctly different system.

responsio antiqua	*responsio nova*
Walter Burley	Roger Swyneshed
William of Shyreswood	Robert Fland
Ralph Strode	Richard Lavenham
Peter of Candia	
Paul of Venice	

positio according to Burley (1).

- Two players, the **opponent** and the **respondent**.
- The **opponent** starts by positing a *positum* φ^*.
- The **respondent** can "admit" or "deny". If he denies, the game is over.
- If he admits the *positum*, the game starts. We set $\Phi_0 := \{\varphi^*\}$.
- In each round n, the **opponent** proposes a statement φ_n and the **respondent** either "concedes", "denies" or "doubts" this statement according to certain rules. If the **respondent** concedes, then $\Phi_{n+1} := \Phi_n \cup \{\varphi_n\}$, if he denies, then $\Phi_{n+1} := \Phi_n \cup \{\neg\varphi_n\}$, and if he doubts, then $\Phi_{n+1} := \Phi_n$.

positio according to Burley (2).

- We call φ_n pertinent (relevant) if either $\Phi_n \vdash \varphi_n$ or $\Phi_n \vdash \neg\varphi_n$. In the fi rst case, the **respondent** has to concede φ_n, in the second case, he has to deny φ_n.
- Otherwise, we call φ_n impertinent (irrelevant). In that case, the **respondent** has to concede it if he knows it is true, to deny it if he knows it is false, and to doubt it if he doesn't know.
- The **opponent** can end the game by saying *Tempus cedat*.

Example 1.

Opponent	Respondent	
I posit that Cicero was the teacher of Alexander the Great: φ^*.	I admit it.	$\Phi_0 = \{\varphi^*\}$.
Cicero was Roman: φ_0.	I concede it.	Impertinent and true; $\Phi_1 = \{\varphi^*, \varphi_0\}$.
The teacher of Alexander the Great was Roman: φ_1.	I concede it.	Pertinent, follows from Φ_1.

Example 2.

Opponent	Respondent	
I posit that Cicero was the teacher of Alexander the Great: φ^*.	I admit it.	$\Phi_0 = \{\varphi^*\}$.
The teacher of Alexander the Great was Greek: φ_0.	I concede it.	Impertinent and true; $\Phi_1 = \{\varphi^*, \varphi_0\}$.
Cicero was Greek: φ_1.	I concede it.	Pertinent, follows from Φ_1.

Example 3 (“order matters!”)

Opponent	Respondent	
I posit that Cicero was the teacher of Alexander the Great: φ^*.	I admit it.	$\Phi_0 = \{\varphi^*\}$.
The teacher of Alexander the Great was Roman: φ_0.	I deny it.	Impertinent and false; $\Phi_1 = \{\varphi^*, \neg\varphi_0\}$.
Cicero was Roman: φ_1.	I deny it.	Pertinent, contradicts Φ_1.

Properties of Burley's *positio*.

- Provided that the *positum* is consistent, no disputation requires the **respondent** to concede φ at step n and $\neg\varphi$ at step m.
- Provided that the *positum* is consistent, Φ_i will always be a consistent set.
- It can be that the **respondent** has to give different answers to the same question (Example 4).
- The **opponent** can force the **respondent** to concede everything consistent (Example 5).

Example 4.

Suppose that the **respondent** is a student, and does not know whether the King of France is currently running.

Opponent	**Respondent**	
I posit that you are the Pope or the King of France is currently running: φ^*	I admit it.	$\Phi_0 = \{\varphi^*\}$.
The King of France is currently running: φ_0.	I doubt it.	Impertinent and unknown; $\Phi_1 = \{\varphi^*\}$.
You are the Pope: φ_1.	I deny it.	Impertinent and false; $\Phi_2 = \{\varphi^*, \neg\varphi_1\}$.
The King of France is currently running: $\varphi_2 = \varphi_0$.	I concede it.	Pertinent, follows from Φ_2.

Example 5.

Suppose that φ does not imply $\neg\psi$ and that φ is known to be factually false.

Opponent	**Respondent**	
I posit φ.	I admit it.	$\Phi_0 = \{\varphi\}$.
$\neg\varphi \vee \psi$.	I concede it.	Either φ implies ψ, then the sentence is pertinent and follows from Φ_0; or it doesn't, then it's impertinent and true (since φ is false); $\Phi_1 = \{\varphi, \neg\varphi \vee \psi\}$.
ψ	I concede it.	Pertinent, follows from Φ_1.

positio according to Swyneshed.

- All of the rules of the game stay as in Burley's system, except for the defi nition of *pertinence*.
- In Swyneshed's system, a proposition φ_n is pertinent if it either follows from φ^* (then the **respondent** has to concede) or its negation follows from φ^* (then the **respondent** has to deny). Otherwise it is impertinent.

Properties of Swyneshed's *positio*.

- Provided that the *positum* is consistent, no disputation requires the **respondent** to concede φ at step n and $\neg\varphi$ at step m.
- The **respondent** never has to give different answers to the same question.
- Φ_i can be an inconsistent set (Example 6).

Example 6.

Suppose that the respondent is a student in Paris, and not a bishop. Write ψ_0 for "You are in Rome" and ψ_1 for "You are a bishop".

Opponent	**Respondent**	
I posit that you are in Rome or you are a bishop: $\psi_0 \vee \psi_1$	I admit it.	$\Phi_0 = \{\psi_0 \vee \psi_1\}$.
You are in Rome or you are a bishop: $\psi_0 \vee \psi_1$.	I concede it.	Pertinent, follows from Φ_0; $\Phi_1 = \{\psi_0 \vee \psi_1\}$.
You are not in Rome: $\neg\psi_0$.	I concede it.	Impertinent, and true; $\Phi_2 = \{\psi_0 \vee \psi_1, \neg\psi_0\}$.
You are not a bishop: $\neg\psi_1$.	I concede it.	Impertinent, and true; $\Phi_3 = \{\psi_0 \vee \psi_1, \neg\psi_0, \neg\psi_1\}$.

Φ_2 is an inconsistent set of sentences.

positio according to Kilvington.

Richard Kilvington (d.1361).

- *Sophismata*, c.1325.
- *obligationes* as a solution method for sophismata.
- He follows Burley's rules, but changes the handling of impertinent sentences. If φ_n is impertinent, then the **respondent** has to concede if it were true if the *positum* was the case, and has to deny if it were true if the *positum* was not the case.

impositio.

- In the *impositio*, the **opponent** doesn't posit a *positum* but instead gives a defi nition or redefi nition.
- **Example 1.** "In this *impositio*, *asinus* will signify *homo*".
- **Example 2.** "In this *impositio*, *deus* will signify *homo* in sentences that have to be denied or doubted and *deus* in sentences that have to be conceded."

  Suppose the **opponent** proposes "*deus est mortalis*".

  - If the **respondent** has to deny or doubt the sentence, then the sentence means *homo est mortalis*, but this is a true sentence, so it has to be conceded. Contradiction.
  - If the **respondent** has to concede the sentence, then the sentence means *deus est mortalis*, but this is a false sentence, so it has to be denied. Contradiction.
- An *impositio* often takes the form of an insoluble.

1450–1550.

- **The Collapse of the Eastern Roman Empire** 1453.
- **The Discovery of the New World** 1492.
- **The Reformation** 1517.

The Fall of Constantinople.



The Fall of Constantinople.

The Council of Ferrara-Florence, "the Union Council" (1438-1445).

- Georgius Gemistos Plethon, (c.1355-1452).
- Bessarion, Bishop of Nicaea (c.1403-1472).
- Johannes Argyropoulos (1415-1487).

May 29th, 1453. Constantinople falls to the Ottomans; Constantine XI Palaeologos dies.

The discovery of the Americas.



The Reformation (1).



The Reformation (1).

- Johannes Gutenberg (c.1400-1468).
- Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia; 1431-1503)
- Cesare Borgia (1475-1507; N. Machiavelli, *Il Principe*), Lucrezia Borgia (1480-1519)
- The Peter Indulgence. Pope Julius II (1507).
- **Martin Luther** (1483 - 1546)
- Leo X (Giovanni de'Medici), Pope from 1513-1521.
- **October 31, 1517.** Luther posts the 95 Theses on the church door.

The Reformation (2).

- **1520**. Luther is excommunicated.
- **1527.** Philipp I the Magnanimous, *Landgraf* of Hesse (1504-1567) founds the first protestant university: **University of Marburg**.
- **1534.** The Act of Supremacy: Henry VIII becomes the head of the Church of England.
- **1542.** Pope Paul III founds the Roman Inquisition (= *Officium Sacrum*).
- **1571.** Pope Pius V founds the Congregation of the Index.

Pierre de la Ramée.

Pierre de la Ramée (Petrus Ramus; 1515-1572)



- *Animadversiones in Dialecticam Aristotelis* (1543).
- Professor at the *Collège de France*.
- Ramistic Logic. *ars disserendi*. Logic of natural discourse.
- Protestant. Died in the Massacre of St. Bartholomew (August 24th, 1572).

Port Royal.

- Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), bishop of Ypres; *Augustinus* (1640), doctrine of strict predestination.
- Abbey of Port Royal, since 1638 centre of Jansenism.
- Pierre Nicole (1625-1695); Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694)
- **1662.** *La logique, ou l'art de penser*. Opposing scholasticism, "epistemological turn".
- *Comprehension* vs *Extension*.
- Letters between Arnauld and Leibniz: 1687-1690.

Leibniz (1).



Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716)

- Work on philosophy, mathematics, law (Doctorate in Law from the University of Altdorf (1667), alchemy, theology, physics, engineering, geology, history.
- Diplomatic tasks (1672).
- Attempts to build a calculating machine (1672).

Leibniz (2).

- **1673-1677**: Invented calculus independently of Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727).
- Research politics; foundation of Academies: Brandenburg, Dresden, Vienna, and St Petersburg.
- **1710**: *Théodicée*. “The best of all possible worlds”.